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Basel Capital Requirements and Bank Credit Risk Taking 
In Developing Countries 
 
Abstract 
 
Existing literature has focused attention on the impact of Basle I and similar capital 
requirement regulations on developed countries where such regulations were found to be 
effective in increasing capital ratios and reducing portfolio credit risk of commercial 
banks. In the present study, we study the impact of such capital requirement regulations 
on commercial banks in 11 developing countries around the world within a cross-section 
framework with the widely popular simultaneous equations model of Shrieves and Dahl 
(1992). Surprisingly, we find that such regulations did not increase the capital ratios of 
banks in the developing countries. This implies that particular attention should be given 
to the business, environmental, legal, cultural realities of such countries while designing 
and implementing such policies for developing countries. However, we find evidence that 
such regulations did reduce portfolio risk of banks. We also find that capital ratios and 
portfolio risk are inversely related in contrast to the predictions of “buffer capital theory”, 
“managerial risk aversion theory”, and “bankruptcy cost avoidance theory.” Our, 
evidence also shows that level of financial development and credit risk are inversely 
related implying that as the financial sector of a country develops it opens up avenues for 
alternative sources of finance, which results in reduced risk.  
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Basel Capital Requirements and Bank Credit Risk Taking 
In Developing Countries 
 
 
One of the most important developments of the banking industry in both developed and 
developing countries all over the world, during the past decade or so, has been the 
implementation of minimum capital standards for internationally active banks under the 
Basle Capital Accord1 and under similar national guidelines2.  
 
Following the successful implementation of the accord and similar national guidelines in 
the 10 OECD countries during the 1988-1992, many developing countries also started to 
implement their national version of the Basle-like capital regulations in order to: (i) 
promote the soundness of their banking system, (ii) to overcome the weaknesses that 
became apparent during the wave of financial crisis in several developing countries; and 
(iii) to counteract the moral hazard problem of newly introduced deposit insurance 
programs in several countries, during the 1990s.  
 
Indeed, recent research3 has confirmed that even though the Basle Accord I was designed 
to apply to the internationally active banks of mostly OECD countries, but its impact was 
rapidly felt more widely and by 1999 formed part of the regime of prudential regulation 
not only for international banks but also for strictly domestic banks in more than 100 
countries, including developing countries. Notwithstanding the debate on the 
effectiveness of such rules in reducing credit risk and other unfavorable consequences of 
such regulations4, such rules have become an important part of the national commercial 
                                                 
1 Purpose of the original 1988 accord was twofold: first, it aimed at creating a “level playing field” among 
banks by raising capital ratios, which were generally perceived as too low in many countries; and second, it 
also aimed at promoting financial stability by adopting a relatively simple approach to credit risk with the 
potential to distort incentives for bank risk-taking. The guidelines of Basle accord were originally adopted 
by the central banking authorities from 12 developed countries (all G-10 countries plus Luxembourg and 
Switzerland) in July, 1988. Their implementation started in 1989 and was completed four years later in 
1993.  
2 Example of Basle like accord in the US is Prompt Corrective Action (PCA) guidelines under Federal 
Deposit Insurance Corporation Improvement Act (FDICIA) of 1991. 
3 Andrew Cornford, 2004.  
4 Many experts in the field believe that the slow growth of the US economy during the late 1980s and early 
1990s could be attributed, at least partially, by the capital regulations imposed on commercial banks, which 
results in a decline in credit flow from banks to the private sector.   
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banking policies worldwide and there are indications that such rules will evolve but 
remain in place in the foreseeable future as well (Basle II, 1996).   
 
In spite of such wide popularity and wide adaptation, Basle I Accord5 was criticized by 
bankers, scholars and policymakers all over the world. These criticisms are a. its failure 
to make adequate allowance for the degree of reduction in risk exposure achievable 
through diversification; b. the possibility that it would lead banks to restrict their lending, 
which would lead to pro-cyclicality of bank lending; c. its arbitrary and undiscriminating 
calibration of certain credit risks. Several issues of special interest to developing 
countries emerged in the aftermath of East Asian Financial Crisis, which include: first, 
effectiveness of capital regulations in contributing to financial stability in developing 
countries; and second, impact of such accord on short-term inter-bank lending, which was 
one of the major factors causing the crisis to begin with6.  
 
Fifteen years after the adoption of the Basle I Accord and amidst the new regulations that 
is being currently made in both developed and developing countries around the world, 
empirical research is far from answering the following questions: what is the net outcome 
of such regulations on bank’s behavior towards credit risk? Can such regulations help 
raise capital in banks that fall short the minimum requirement? What was the bank’s 
response to such rules, i.e. did they increase the level of their capital, forego risky 
projects or sell off assets? Did the guidelines modify the credit risk of their portfolio and 
if yes, to which risk categories did they reallocate their assets? How can the impact of 
these rules vary with the level of economic development of different countries? Many 
other important questions remain answered.  
 
In addition to the unanswered questions as mentioned above, most of the studies on the 
subject to date were conducted on the U.S. banking sector and other developed countries. 
                                                 
5 Basle Committee on Banking Supervision has already responded by introducing the New Framework for 
Capital Adequacy in June 1999 with major emphasis put on promoting stability of the international 
financial stability. However, the new accord was also criticized on: (1) problems of formulating effective 
guidelines for the surveillance of banks’ capital adequacy; (2) possible obstacles to improved transparency; 
(3) recourse to the ratings of the credit rating agencies may damage flow of external financing into 
developing countries, specially in times of emergency; 
6 Andrew Cornford, 2004.  
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Studies analyzing the impact of the implementation of Basle like regulations and 
guidelines in the emerging and developed countries within the framework of cross-
sectional analysis remain surprisingly limited7. Moreover, under Basle II new 
regulations8 and some changes to the existing regulations were made in 1996. Signatories 
to the new Accord are expected to implement the provisions by 2006. It is absolutely 
essential that policy makers of the developed countries as well as their development 
partners (foreign governments, IMF, the World Bank etc.) understand the special needs 
of the host countries in order to enable the latter to reap the benefit of such regulations.  
 
In the present article, an attempt is made to study the impact of Basle-like capital 
regulations on the credit risk taking in a selected number of developing countries and 
extends previous empirical analysis in several directions. First, a larger dataset 
comprising of 11 developing countries9, which have adopted and enforced capital 
regulation in the last decade, are studied. Second, instead of studying countries in 
isolation, we study them in a cross-section framework. Third, instead of using aggregate 
data we use data on individual banks. Forth, framework of this study accommodates both 
shocks to bank capital arising from external sources – such as business cycle and shocks 
originating from regulatory sources – such as in the case of an increase in capital ratios. 
Fifth, we set up the framework so as to trace out the reaction of banks that fall short of 
the minimum capita required.  
 
The evidence gathered in the paper points to the following empirical findings. First, 
capital ratios and bank portfolio risk are negatively related to each other. Second, capital 
regulations reduced portfolio risk of commercial banks, but it did not have the desired 
impact of increasing capital ratios. Finally, liberalization and financial development 
seems to have reduced port folio risk of banks. However, they do not seem to have any 
impact on capital ratios.  
 
                                                 
7 Previous empirical work on the impact of capital requirements on bank lending in developing countries 
includes Ferri et al. (1999), Chiuri et al. (2001) and Ito (2000).  
8 Basle II: New Accord: 1996.  
9 India, Argentina, Hungary, Turkey, Venezuela, Slovenia, Brazil, Korea, Malaysia, Thailand, Chile. 
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The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the theoretical and 
empirical literature dealing with the effects of capital requirements on bank’s portfolio 
risk, in the context of the Basle Accord. Section 3 presents the data used in the study, 
while section 4 outlines the empirical methodology. Results of regression analysis are 
discussed in section 5 and some conclusions and policy directives for developing 
countries are presented in section 6.  
 
2. Bank Capital Regulation and its impact on banks’ risk-taking in theory and in 
practice 
 
2.1 Review of Theory Literature  
According to the existing theories, the main justification for capital regulations of banks 
is often given in terms of “moral hazard” problem. The problem states that in the 
presence of a mis-priced deposit insurance scheme, bank managers may not do enough to 
reduce risk. Instead they will opt for risky projects that are accompanied by higher return, 
which if not stopped in time, may compromise banks’ solvency in the long run. 
Therefore, the theoretical reason for capital adequacy regulations is to counteract the risk-
shifting incentives originating from deposit insurance.  
 
Till date several strands of theoretical literature have emerged on the topic. A first strand 
uses the portfolio approach of Pyle (1971) and Hart and Jaffee(1974), where banks are 
treated as utility-maximizing units. Within such a framework adopted for mean-variance 
analysis to compare banks’ portfolio choice with and without a capital regulation Koehn 
and Santomero (1980) showed that the introduction of higher leverage ratios will lead 
banks to shift their portfolio to riskier assets. As a solution to such a situation, Kim and 
Santomero (1988) suggested that this problem can be overcome if the regulators use 
correct measures of risk in the computation of solvency ratio.  
 
Subsequently, Rochet (1992) extended the work of Koehn and Santomero and found that 
effectiveness of capital regulations depended on whether the banks were value 
maximizing or utility maximizing. In the former case, capital regulations could not 
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prevent risk taking actions by banks. In the later case, capital regulations could only be 
effective if the weights used in the computations of the ratio are equal to the systematic 
risk of the assets. A further theoretical ground argued that banks chose portfolio with 
maximal risk and minimum diversification.  
 
The second strand of literature on the topic utilizes option models. Furlong and 
Keeley(1989) and Keeley and Furlong (1990) developed several models under this 
framework and showed that higher capital requirements reduce the incentives for a value-
maximizing bank to increase asset risk, which is opposite to the conclusions of first 
generation studies as discussed previously. They criticized that the utility-maximizing 
framework, which comes to opposite conclusions, is inappropriate because it 
mischaracterizes the bank’s investment opportunity set by omitting the option value of 
deposit insurance and the possibility of the bank failure. However, this evidence of the 
option models was weakened by the findings of Gennottee and Pyle (1991). They relaxed 
the assumption that banks invest in zero net present value assets and found that there are 
now plausible situations in which an increase in capital requirements results in an 
increase of asset risk. 
 
Using a dynamic framework (multiple periods), as opposed to the static framework 
discussed in the preceding paragraphs, Blum (1999) found that capital regulation may 
increase banks’ riskiness due to an intertemporal effect. Using a two-period model, he 
showed if banks find it too costly to raise additional equity to meet new capital 
requirements tomorrow or are unable to do so, they will increase risk today. He also 
pointed out that this second effect will reinforce the well-known risk-shifting incentives 
due to the reduction in profits.  
 
Subsequently, Marshal and Prescott (2000) showed that capital requirements directly 
reduced the probability of default and portfolio risk and suggested that optimal bank 
capital regulations could be made by incorporating state-contingent penalties based on 
bank’s performance. At the same time, Vlaar (2000) found that capital requirements acted 
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as a burden for inefficient banks when asset of banks is assumed to be fixed. However, 
such regulations increased the profitability of efficient banks.  
 
In short, whether imposing harsher capital requirements leads banks to increase or 
decrease the risk structure of their asset portfolio is still a debated question and, al least 
for now, it seems, there is no simple answer to this question.  
 
2.2 An example  
In the following example10 we attempt to clarify the risk effect of capital regulation by 
briefly restating the key rules of 1988 Basle Accord and discussing the alternative 
approaches that the banks can take to comply with them.  
 
The 1988 Basle Accord standards are almost entirely focused on credit portfolio risk, the 
risk of loss due to borrower or counterparty default. 11The central regulation to the 1988 
Accord is the obligation for internationally active banks of the signatory countries to 
continually meet two capital adequacy ratios, the so called tier 1 capital and total capital 
ratios. Both ratios share the same denominator, which is a risk-weighted sum of banks’ 
on-balance sheet and off-balance sheet activities. A simplified formula of the risk-
weighted asset (RWA) of a bank is given by12: 
 
RWA = 0*(bucket1) +0.2*(bucket2) +0.5*bucket3) +1.0*(bucket4)    ………… [i] 
   
                                                 
10 Adopted from Patrick Van Roy, 2003.  
11 Subsequent amendments were made to take account of other types of risks. The Basle Committee on 
Banking Supervision announced Basle II New Accord in 1996, which is based on three mutually enforcing 
pillars (minimum capital requirements – supervisory review – market discipline) that allow banks and 
supervisors to evaluate additional types of risks, like operations risks and interest rate risk in order to avoid 
treating credit risk in isolation. Implementation of the New Accord (though probably not by all adopting 
countries) is expected by the year-end 2006. 
 
12 Strictly speaking, formula [1] is only valid for on-balance sheet assets. Off-balance sheet items are also 
assigned to the four risk buckets but they involve additional weights reflecting the nature of their operation. 
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Where bucket 113 consists of assets with zero default risk, bucket 2 of assets with a low 
rate of default, bucket 3 of medium-risk assets and the remaining assets fall into bucket 4. 
The denominator of both capital adequacy ratios thus represents risk weighted assets. 
However, the tier 1 capital ratio and total capital ratio differ with respect to their 
numerator, where the former consist of only tier 1 capital while the latter consists of both 
tier 1 and tier 2 capitals14. 
 
Banks that wish to raise their capital adequacy ratio (either to obey the minimum 
requirements or for other non-regulatory reasons) have three alternatives / options 
available, which include: first, they can increase their capital level (depending on the 
regulatory ratio concerned, this can be done in several ways); second, decrease their risk-
weighted assets as proportion of total assets; and / or third, decrease their total assets. 
Equation [ii]15 decomposes the growth rate of the capital adequacy ratio into three terms, 
the growth rate of capital, the growth of the credit risk, and the growth rate of assets.  
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13 Examples of bucket 1 capital are cash, government bonds / securities, bucket 2 are loans to banks, bucket 
3 are essentially residential mortgage loans) and bucket 4 are the remaining assets, in particular, loans to 
non-banks. 
14 Tier 1 capital, also called core capital, consists mainly of stockholder equity capital and disclosed 
reserves, whereas tier 2 capital or “supplementary capital” includes elements like undisclosed reserves and 
subordinated debts (provided that their maturity do not exceed five years). The difference between tier 1 
and tier 2 capital thus emphasized the extent to which capital of a bank is permanent or explicit.  
 
15 Equation [5] is derived as follows  and 1)]().[()( −= tRWAtKtCAR )(/)()( tAtRWAtRISK = . 
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Where == RWAKCAR / 16capital adequacy ratio (either Tier 1 or Total K ratio); 
K=capital (either Tier 1 K or Total K); == ARWARISK /  Credit risk ratio; and A=Total 
assets. We discuss these measures also in section 4.  
 
From the above equation, it can be seen that a ( mandatory) increase in the capital 
adequacy ratio does not prevent banks from raising the credit risk of their portfolio 
provided that the growth rate of the credit risk is lower than the growth rate of capital 
holding total assets constant. As a result, the Basle Accord, which aimed at imposing a 
higher capital buffer against insolvency, may well have encouraged banks to take on 
more credit risk, thereby having an ambiguous effect on their financial stability. In the 
following sections we analyze the relationship between change in capital ratios ( ) 
and change in risk ( )
CAR∆
RISK∆ 17 to investigate the true relationship. 
 
2.3 Empirical Literature Review  
Empirical work in the area concentrates on two aspects of capital regulations, first, to 
investigate whether banks fulfill the capital requirements by increasing capital or by 
altering the risk weighted assets; and second, to test if the enforcement of capital 
requirements can result in a contraction in banks’ supply of loans or best described as 
credit crunch. In the present paper we deal with the first aspect.  
 
Some of the major empirical papers on the impact of capital regulations on risk taking 
and capital ratios of commercial banks are listed in Table 1 for both U.S. and outside the 
U.S. banks. However, we do not discuss all of them in the following review.  
 
                                                 
16 Alternate definitions of capital adequacy ratios include: ratio of capital to total assets, ratio of capital to 
risk weighted assets etc. given in Rime (2000).  Similarly, for risk alternative definitions are total risk 
weighted assets as percentage of total assets and nonperforming loans as percentage of total assets used in 
Aggarwal and Jacqures (1998). 
17   Several strands of empirical literature exist in this connection. We focus on the relationship between 
and . Other strands include: the effect of capital requirements on capital levels, K; on total 
assets A; and also on the macro-economy through reductions in bank lending, which is also called “credit 
crunch literature”.  
CAR∆ RISK∆
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Many of these papers utilize a simultaneous equations approach, which allows comparing 
the behavior of undercapitalized and adequately capitalized banks with respect to changes 
in risk and capital ratios. This is developed fully in section 4. 
 
The literature begins with Shrives and Dahl (1992), who use several periods of cross-
section data on commercial banks in the U.S. under the simultaneous equations 
framework mentioned before. They found that the effectiveness of risk-based capital 
regulations depended on how well the regulations reflected the true risk exposure of 
banks. 
 
Results of U.S. studies are not easy to interpret as the implementation of the second stage 
of the Basle Accord, between end-1990 and end-1992, which coincided with the passage 
of the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Improvement Act (FDICIA) in December 
1991. Section 131 of FDICIA, Prompt Corrective Action (PCA), went one step further 
than the Basle Accord by defining three regulatory ratios (the Basle capital standards plus 
a leverage requirement) and five categories in which banks are classified according to 
their compliance with the three ratios. Thus, it is hard to ascribe the findings of the two 
papers by Aggarwal and Jacques (1997, 2001) to the Basle Accord as opposed to 
FDICIA, as U.S. banks’ behavior is likely to have been affected by both regulations over 
the period that they consider. They found that banks in the undercapitalized categories 
increased their capital target ratios more quickly than other banks with higher initial 
capital. But, if one is interested in the impact of capital regulations in a broad sense then 
this does not remain a big problem.   
 
The study by Jacqus and Nigro (1997) deals exclusively with the consequences of the 
Basle Accord, as it concentrates on the years 1990-91, which is the period before FDICIA 
was passed. They found that capital regulation has a significant impact on risk and vice 
versa. But the problem of this study is the very low number of undercapitalized 
institutions in Jacques and Nigro’s sample – less than 2 percent of the total number of 
banks, which may have reduced the reliability of some of their estimates.  
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Two papers present some non-U.S. evidence regarding the relationship between capital 
ratios and credit risk. Ediz, Michael, and Perraudin (1998) employ confidential U.K. data 
including detailed information about the balance sheet and profit and loss account of all 
British banks, during the 1989-1995 periods whereas Rime (2001) uses Swiss data for the 
period 1989-1996, where the former used a limited information technique different from 
the simultaneous equations framework mentioned earlier.  Their study used a sample for 
the period 1989-1995 and applied random effects model and found that capital 
regulations were effective in increasing the capital to meet the minimum standard. 
Unfortunately, Ediz et al.’s model leads to the puzzling result that banks are adjusting 
their capital levels each year by more than the difference between the current level and 
the target they have in mind, which means that banks are overshooting the target ( and by 
more and more each year). The study by Rime (2001) is interesting because it provides 
the first application of the simultaneous-equations model reviewed in section 4 to non-
U.S. banks. His results indicated that Swiss banks were reacted to capital regulations by 
increasing their capital but this did not change banks’ risk-taking. One of the problems 
with this study might be the fact that Rime adopted the PCA regulatory classification to 
measure regulatory pressure on Swiss banks, which might be inappropriate given that the 
additional requirements set by PCA have not been adopted formally by any other country 
than the U.S.  
 
Sheldon (1996) used an option-pricing framework to analyze the risk effects of capital 
adequacy on eleven G-10 countries. He found that the Basle Accord did not have a risk-
increasing impact on banks’ portfolio. But this result is not easy to interpret as he did not 
control for regulatory and non-regulatory influences. Moreover, sample coverage of this 
study is not representative for the countries they represent. 
 
Roy (2003) studied the impact of capital requirement on risk taking by commercial banks 
of seven OECD countries within the framework of the simultaneous equations 
framework. He found that changes in capital and credit risk were negatively related over 
the period studied, which supported the argument that stringent capital requirements went 
hand in hand with greater financial stability in addition to imposing a higher capital 
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buffer against unexpected credit risk losses. However, they also found evidence 
indicating that the regulation was ineffective in raising the capital ratio of 
undercapitalized banking institutions in France and in Italy, which leaves room for the 
validity of the argument presented above.  
 
We summarize the finding of the articles discussed in the review section as follows: these 
articles generally supported the idea that undercapitalized banks increased their capital 
adequacy ratios in the first half of the 1990s. A similar trend was observed for well 
capitalized banks but to a lesser extent. However, there is little consensus among the 
papers reviewed that banks, whether adequately capitalized or not, engaged in riskier 
activities as a result of capital regulations. Finally, according to these papers, changes in 
capital adequacy ratios and in risk ratios appeared to be mostly unrelated.  
 
Therefore, the main contribution of this study is to extent the empirical literature on the 
effects of the Basle Accord like national capital regulations by using a simultaneous 
equations model (Shrives and Dahl (1992)) for 11 different countries along with a 
representative data set whose construction is detailed in the next section.  
 
3. Sample Description 
We used the Basle like capital accord implementation year / dates prepared by Chiuri et 
al (2001) and also presented in Table 2. For each country we extracted bank specific 
variables data for five years from Bankscope18, 2004 following the year of adoption of 
capital requirement regulations. We examined a five-year data span to find for changes in 
the relationship between capital adequacy and risk. We also include only large 
commercial banks in the analysis due mainly to two reasons: first, capital adequacy ratios 
are generally implemented on larger banks that are active internationally whereas smaller 
domestic banks are kept outside the jurisdiction of such regulations; and second, data for 
smaller banks are less complete in Bankscope. Initially we get 1500 observations for 
bank-years. But all variables are not available for all year and hence the number of 
                                                 
18 Bankscope is a database of banking account figures which is a joint product of Fitch IBCA and Bureau 
Van Dijk, a major rating agency and a publisher of financial databases on CD-ROM. We use the CD-ROM 
for 2004.  
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observations declines to about 300 as we estimate the models. For country specific 
variables, we use annual data from World Bank Data available in the World Development 
Indicators via the internet.  
 
4. Empirical Methodology  
4.1 The Model  
As we have mentioned already, capital ratios (CAR) and capital levels (K) for both tier 1 
and total capital were extracted from Bankscope19 to compute the credit risk ratio (RISK) 
using the following formulas: 
 
RWA
RWA
K
K
CAR
K == …………. [1] 
 
RISK
A
RWA = ……………… [2] 
 
Following Shreieves and Dahl ( 1992), we started with the following to basic equations.  
titi
d
ti ECARCAR ,,, +∆=∆ ………………. [3] 
titi
d
ti SRISKRISK ,,, +∆=∆ ……………….. [4] 
 
Where,  and are the observed changes in captal and risk ratios, 
respectively for bank i in period t. The  and variables represent 
discretionary adjustments in capital and risk, and the last two terms are exogenously 
determined factors.  
tiCAR ,∆ tiRISK ,∆
ti
dCAR ,∆ tid RISK ,∆
 
In accordance with Shrieves and Dahl (1992), discretionary adjustment in capital and risk 
are defied next using a partial adjustment procedure. 
 
                                                 
19 CAR and K were extracted from Bankscope and formulas [1] and [2] were used to compute the credit 
risk ratio.  
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)( 1,
*
,, −−=∆ tititid CARCARCAR α …………………… [5] 
)( 1,
*
,, −−=∆ tititid RISKRISKRISK β …………………… [6] 
 
Where,  and are the target capital and risk ratios for the i th commercial 
banks in year t. Next substituting equations [5] and [6] in equations [3] and [4], 
respectively we get the following expressions 
*
,tiCAR
*
,tiRISK
 
titititi ECARCARCAR ,1,
*
,, )( +−=∆ −α ……………………….[7] 
titititi SRISKRISKRISK ,1,
*
,, )( +−=∆ −β …………………….[8] 
 
The above two equations show that the observed changes in capital in period t are a 
function of the differences between the target level of capital in period t and previous 
period’s actual capital, and any exogenous shock. Similar, argument applied for risk.  
 
Shrieves and Dahl (1992) pointed out that the target level of capital and risk are not 
observable and, hence, could not be measures directly. As a result, they measured the two 
variables indirectly with the help of a set of variables, which in turns are observable and, 
therefore, are measurable directly. We follow the same approach. Exogenous shocks 
included in the two equations, captures unexpected shocks to the bank due to both 
external factors (changes in the macroeconomic conditions) and internal factors 
(unexpected changes in bank’s financial conditions).  
 
In the next step, we create the set of variables that influence the target levels of capital 
and risk, some of which have already been used for the same purpose in previous studies 
of the relationship between bank capital and risk20.  
4.2 Bank Specific Variables  
i. Natural Logarithm of Banks Total Assets (SIZE): 
                                                 
20 Shrieves and Dahl (1992), Jacques and Nigro (1997), Aggarwal and Jacques (2001), Rime (2001), and 
Aggarwal, Jacques and Rice (2000).  
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Aggarwal and Jacques (2001) pointed out that larger banks may be willing to hold less 
capital owing to the fact that they have better ability to raise capital if needed compared 
to the other banks. It can also be pointed out that, due to diversification benefit, larger 
bank will have lower risk. Therefore, we assume that SIZE has negative relation with 
both the target level of capital and risk. Such expected signs for all variables are 
presented below.  
 
Table: Expected Signs of Bank Characteristics Variables  
Name of the 
Variable  
Change in 
Capital Ratio  
Change in Risk 
SIZE  - - 
LLOSS + - 
ROA + . 
BONDS - - 
LIQUIDITY - + 
 
 
ii. Bank’s Profitability (ROA): 
More profitable banking institutions may be able to increase their level of capital through 
retained earnings. Therefore, we assume that there is a positive relationship between 
profit and capital.  
 
iii. Current loan loss provisions to potential bad loans (LLOSS)  
We include these variables in the risk equation based on the assumption that banks with 
higher level of loan losses will exhibit lower future levels of risk-adjusted assets. As a 
result, a negative relation should exist between target risk and loan loss provisions for 
bad loans. Alternately, for capital we argue that the relationship with loan loss should be 
positive, since banks with more expected loss could be assumed to raise their levels of 
capital to comply with regulatory requirement and to mitigate solvency risk.  
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iv. Ratio of government securities to total assets (BONDS)  
Banks with a higher percentage of government securities can be expected to have higher 
capital ratios through sales of securities. Aggarwal and Jacques (2001) point out, if banks 
with large holdings of government securities retained, rather than sold, these securities 
during a falling rate environment, then they may have lower levels of capital to comply 
with existing regulations. At the same time, banks with high ratios of government 
securities in their asset portfolios will be exhibiting lower levels of risk. Thus we proceed 
with the assumption that both capital and risk are inversely related with bank’s holding of 
government securities and bonds.  
 
v. Ratio of liquid reserves to total assets (LIQUIDITY)  
Banks with higher liquidity ratios are faced with less risk and, hence, need to hold less 
capital, whereas, such banks may be willing to increase their levels of risk. Therefore we 
assume that a negative relationship should exist between the ratio of liquid reserves to 
total assets and the level of a bank’s capital and a positive relationship between this ratio 
and the level of a bank’s portfolio risk.  
 
4.3. Country Specific Variables  
vi. MacroEconomic Variables21,  
We include the following three variables: inflation and per capita GDP growth rate to 
control for the changes in macro-economic conditions that also influences the 
relationship between risk and capital adequacy. We assumed that a lion’s share of country 
specific heterogeneity were controlled for by these variables in regression equations, so 
that what remains left should be negligible. So, we do not include country specific 
dummy variables.  
 
vi. Foreign Investment as Proxy for Liberalization: 
 It should be pointed out that all of the countries included in the sample have undergone 
considerable privatization (reducing government ownership) and liberalization (allowing 
foreign entry) throughout the 1990s, as part of structural their adjustment program. 
                                                 
21 Chiuri et al., 2001 
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However, liberalization in the financial services obviously took different forms in 
different countries. Notwithstanding these diverse liberalization measures, allowing entry 
of foreign banks and ownership by foreign banks were a key component of the 
liberalization programs. Such measures have led to changes in the structure, operation 
and competition in the domestic financial services industry.  Such changes may have 
affected the relationship between risk and capital adequacy requirements, hence, to 
control for this change we include annual foreign investment as percentage of gross 
domestic product as one of the variables in the model. Coefficient of this variable will 
show us the impact of changes in foreign investment on capital ratios and risk of 
commercial banks.   
 
vii. Level of financial development  
In accordance with the existing literature, we use domestic credit as percentage of GDP 
as measure of the level of financial development in a country. Because we use a pooled 
dataset, we are able to infer how the relationship between risk and capital adequacy 
changes with changes in the level of development of the financial sector. This is 
important in the context of developing countries, were we can not take the existence of a 
well developed and sustainable financial sector for granted.  
 
xi. Regulatory Pressure Variable (REG)22  
Following Partick Van Roy (2003), we create the regulatory pressure variable to identify 
the undercapitalized banks as follows  
 
⎩⎨
⎧ <−=
otherwise
THRifCARCARTHR
REG
0
 
 
Where, THR represents some threshold level that will have to be chosen. Such measure 
enjoys twofold advantages: first, it shows the level below which a bank should be 
regarded as ‘undercapitalized’ and second, it also shows the size of the gap that separates 
                                                 
22 Patrick Van Roy, 2003. Aggarwal and Jacques (1998) gave an alternative definition of this variable 
adapted for Prompt Corrective Action (PTA) of FDICIA, 1991. But we did not use that approach.  
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the bank’s capital ratio from this level23. In accordance with the existing literature, the 
threshold level is the minimum regulatory requirement or the minimum plus one standard 
deviation of the bank’s own capital ratio24. In our study we assume that this is 8 percent 
for simplicity and also because almost all of the 10 developing countries made 8 or 
similar figure the target ratio.  
 
x. Year Dummy25  
Dummy variables for four year of the reference period (five years after the 
implementation of capital adequacy regulations) were used to detect the changes in the 
relationship between risk and capital adequacy with time. However, we used the first year 
following the implementation of capital adequacy as the base year and did not put 
dummy for the first year to avoid multicollinearity.  
 
5. Econometric Results  
Relationship between capital adequacy and risk 
As already mentioned, we used both simultaneous equations model, called full 
information estimation and single equation estimates, called limited information 
estimations to determine the relationship between capital adequacy and risk with GMM 
and 3SLS to check the robustness of our results across alternative estimation settings and 
methods. These estimation results are presented in Table 4 through 7 for both the CAR 
and RISK equations26. Table 4 and 6 shows result of full information estimation, whereas 
table 5 and 7 shows result of limited information. GMM estimation results are shown in 
columns 1 and 3, whereas 3SLS results are shown in columns 5 and 7 in each of these 
tables. Each of these tables show results in panel a for total capital and panel b for tier 1 
capital.  
                                                 
23 In several studies the second aspect was overlooked due to simplification, where a dummy variable was 
created that took value of one whenever capital adequacy ratios were below some threshold level and zero 
otherwise.  
24 The later approach captures the idea that banks generally maintain a buffer above the minimum 
requirements.  
25 Patrick Van Roy, 2003. 
26 As we have already pointed out, if the simultaneous equations model is not properly specified, then all 
parameter estimates of the model will be biased, which can be avoided by estimating the equations one by 
one separately. Limited information estimation estimates these equations individually.  
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At the same time, we carry out this analysis based several alternative model 
specifications. In columns 1 and 5 we present results of a basic model with only year 
dummy and bank specific characteristics. But in columns 3 and 7, we add four country 
specific variables to the basic model. Furthermore, we add regulatory pressure dummy to 
both of the model specifications variable in Table 6 and 7 only.  
 
In columns 1 and 5 of panel a of Table 4, we present results for the simple model with 
only bank characteristics variables and year dummies in the equation based on GMM full 
information method. But in columns 3 and 7 we present estimate after adding four 
country specific variables to the basic model. In column 1, our estimates show a negative 
relation between DCAR and DRISK from both the CAR and RISK equations. The 
coefficient is equal to -100.474 in the CAR equation and -0.032 in the RISK equation 
both significant at the 1 percent level. Similarly, in column 5, we re-estimate the basic 
model based on 3SLS, and again get similar negative result. In column 3, we get the same 
negative relationship after adding four country specific variables to the basic model of 
column 1. Again the relationship does not change when we re-estimate it via 3SLS and 
present output in column 7. All the coefficients of CAR and RISK variables are 
significant at the 1 percent level in all eight models. Therefore, we find strong support of 
the negative relationship between RISK and CAR from full information estimates.  
 
In panel b of Table 4 we present estimates for tier 1 capital. We present estimates of 
similar basic models in column 1 and 5 with bank characteristics variables and year 
dummies only. In columns 3 and 7, we add the four country specific variables to it. In the 
CAR equation of column 1, we find the negative relation between CAR and RISK. In the 
other models these coefficients are not significant. Therefore, we get weak evidence in 
support of the inverse relationship. 
 
In panel a of Table 5, we follow the same format of table 4 with respect to model 
specification and use limited information estimation method. We again find that CAR 
and RISK are inversely related in all the eight models of panel a. All the relevant 
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coefficients are significant at the 1 percent level. However, in panel b, we only find 
significant coefficient in column 1. 
 
So far, we get empirical support in favor of the hypothesis that capital and risk are 
inversely related in the selected countries. Evidence is stronger when we use full 
information estimates and also when we consider total capital. These results lead to a 
strong rejection of the theories providing a rationale for a positive relationship between 
changes in capital and risk and also to some of the existing empirical literature. It also 
does not support Koehn and Santomero’s27 conclusion that banks will try to compensate 
for the loss of utility due to higher capital ratios by switching to higher risk. Higher 
capital ratios did not lead to higher credit risk, and did not endanger financial stability of 
these developing countries. It also contradicts the predictions of a positive relationship by 
“buffer capital theory”, “managerial risk aversion theory”, and “bankruptcy cost 
avoidance theory”. 
 
Impact of the Regulatory Dummy Variable 
As we have pointed out Table 6 and 7 present results when the regulatory dummy 
variable in included in the models. In column 1 and 3 of panel a of Table 6, we find that 
the coefficient of interest is only significant and negative in the RISK equations alone. 
This implies that minimum capital regulations did not increase risk of the 
undercapitalized banks. However, in column 5 and 7 we find that the coefficient is 
significant and negative in both the CAR and RISK equations. In column 1 and 3 of panel 
b, we observe that the coefficient is significant and negative only in CAR equations. 
Again, in column 5 and 7, we find that the coefficients are significant and negative in 
CAR equations. This seems to imply that banks that were undercapitalized decreased 
their capital ratios in response to regulations, which we can not explain and is opposite to 
our expectations. This is opposite to the provided by Van Roy (2003) for 10 OECD 
countries. In 10 OECD countries capital regulations successfully increased in capital 
ratios of undercapitalized banks.  
                                                 
27 This is also in line with evidence provided by Dahl and Shrieves (1992), Aggarwal and Jacques (1997), 
Jacques and Nigro (1997) etc.  
 22
 
In Table 7, we present estimation results of the same models based on limited 
information method. In column 1 and 3 of panel a, coefficient of regulation dummy is 
significant and negative in both the equations. But in column 5 and 6, they are only 
significant in CAR equations.  In column 1 and 3 of panel b, the coefficient is only 
significant in CAR equations. Similarly, in column 5 and 6, the coefficient is significant 
and negative in CAR equations only.  
 
This implies that stringent capital requirements were accompanied by a reduction in 
credit risk, which ultimately contributed to greater stability of the banking sector. But we 
could not explain our empirical findings that capital regulations and capital ratios of 
undercapitalized banks were negatively related. One interpretation may be that in most of 
these developing countries, such regulations were undertaken in the aftermath of financial 
crisis or bank crisis and at those state banks were relatively more concerned with 
managing risk as opposed to increasing capital ratios.  For example, the regulatory 
forbearance of Indonesian28 government towards the failing and financial weak banks in 
the aftermath of Asian Crisis can be mentioned. During this period of time, regulatory 
minimum capital ratios during this interim regime were lower than eight percent and this 
may have stopped the capital ratios from increasing. As a result of such policies, capital 
ratios did not increase in response to regulations.   
 
Impact of the level of Financial Development 
In most of the CAR equations under the various models we find that the coefficient of 
financial development variable is insignificant, which indicates that there is no clear 
relationship between the level of financial development and CAR.  
 
With regards to RISK equation, in many cases we find that there is significant and 
negative relationship of this variable and RISK. It implies that the higher the level of 
development of financial development in a country, the lower the level of risk. This 
makes intuitive sense. More developed financial system implies that there are relatively 
                                                 
28 Donsyah Yudistira, 2003.  
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more alternatives to commercial banks to manage the impact of higher capital 
requirements. As a result, they do not need to resort to investing in higher risk projects to 
increase their income to meet stricter capital regulations.  
 
Impact of the Liberalization Proxy 
In the CAR equations of the models, the coefficient of annual foreign investment as 
percentage of gross domestic product is insignificant most of the time. This implies that 
there is no significant impact of liberalization policies on changes in capital ratios.  
 
In the RISK equations, we find several negative and significant relations for the foreign 
investment equations. This implies that liberalization has reduced portfolio risk of banks 
in the developing countries29. However, it may be argued that the attempt to strengthen 
the regulatory environment in developing countries may have created incentives to avoid 
risk even in the wake of increasing competition.  
 
6. Conclusion 
In this paper, we provided some evidence on the effects that a stricter enforcement of 
minimum capital discipline can have on bank intermediation in less developed financial 
systems. Notwithstanding the general recognition that capital regulations may have 
different effects on bank behavior according to diverse institutional and developmental 
features of each economy, still we observe that bank capital regulation did not achieve 
the primary goal of increasing capital ratios of undercapitalized banks, which contradicts 
the existing empirical evidence of several developed countries during early 1990s. 
However, we find that capital regulations did reduce portfolio risk of banks, in spite of 
fear that banks would involve in riskier projects as a result of such regulations.  
 
We also find strong empirical support that capital ratios and portfolio risk are inversely 
related in the selected developing countries, which contradicts the predictions of a 
                                                 
29 This is contrary to the evidence provided by Pedro Elosegui et al (2002), who found that following 
privatization and foreign entry, banks did increase their asset portfolio risk as a result of increased 
competition.  
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positive relationship by “buffer capital theory”, “managerial risk aversion theory”, and 
“bankruptcy cost avoidance theory”. 
 
Our results also suggest that financial development is inversely associated with bank risk. 
One reason for this may be that as financial development occurs it opens up new 
opportunities / alternatives for the banks to deal with capital regulations without resorting 
to investing in riskier projects.   
 
We also find evidence that liberalization is inversely associated with bank risk, which is 
contrary to the existing empirical evidence that foreign entry increases competition in the 
domestic banks sector and thus domestic banks resort to riskier projects to retain their 
income. We argue that, in spite of competition, banks become more concerned about 
making risky loans and respond by reducing risk weighted assets in their portfolio. We 
believe that strengthened regulatory environment had this impact on risk taking behavior 
of banks.   
 
Finally, we would like to state that this paper contributes to the on going discussion on 
the new Capital Accord. However, our findings reveal important differences regarding 
the effectiveness of such policies between the developed and developing countries 
regarding the failure of increasing capital adequacy ratios in the latter countries. As a 
result, we propose that particular attention should be paid to the process of enforcement 
of a stricter bank capital discipline in developing countries. Presence of a variety of 
institutional, legal, cultural, business environmental, and developmental constraints need 
not be read as an alibi for not modernizing capital regulations. We strongly believe that it 
should be used to motivate a timely removal / mitigation of such constraints, on the part 
of the domestic authorities, and more differentiated regulatory option on the part of the 
international authorities setting regulatory standards, which will effectively cater to the 
special needs of problems associated with diversity.  
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Table 1: Previous Studies on the behavior of banks regarding capital ratios and risk taking  
Name of the Authors  Sample Period  Main Objectives Findings  Related Studies  
George Pinteris ( 
2001)  
U.S. commercial 
banks with assets of 
more than 5 million 
during 1994-1999  
Examine the recent 
impact of the recent 
financial crisis in East 
Asia and Russia on 
the behavior of large 
commercial banks 
with respect to 
choices of capital and 
risk.  
Large U.S. banks did alter 
their behavior towards capital 
requirement but not towards 
risk. “Megabanks” and less 
adequately capitalized banks 
respond to the crisis by raising 
their levels of capital.  
Shrieves and Dahl 
(1992), Jacques 
and Nigro (1997). 
Baltagi’s ( 1981) 
error-component 
2SLS 
 
Pedro Elosegui and 
George Pinteris 
(2002)  
1996-1999  
On Argentine Banks  
Examines the impact 
of privatization and 
foreign entry on the 
choices of risk of 
various types of 
banking institutions in 
the Argentine banking 
system during. 
Do not find any differences in 
the behavior of various 
institutions in terms of capital. 
However, find evidence that 
both existing foreign banks 
and privatized banks did 
increase their asset portfolio 
risk following privatization 
and foreign entry.  
Shrieves and Dahl 
( 1992)  
Baltagi’s ( 1981) 
error-component 
2SLS 
Patrick Van Roy ( 
2003) 
1988-1995 
Seven G-10 countries.  
Canada 
France  
Italy  
Japan  
Sweden  
United Kingdom  
United States  
Examines the impact 
of the 1988 Basle 
Capital Accord on the 
behavior of banks of 
seven G-10 countries 
toward capital and 
risk.  
Findings indicate that changes 
in capital and credit risk were 
negatively related over the 
period under studied. 
However, also found that the 
regulations were ineffective in 
raising the capital ratio of 
undercapitalized banking 
institutions in France and 
Italy.  
Shrieves and Dahl 
( 1992) 
3 Stage SLS  
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Table 1: Previous Studies on the behavior of banks regarding capital ratios and risk taking (Contd.) 
Name of the Authors  Sample Period  Main Objectives Findings  Related Studies  
Maria Concetta 
Chiuri, 
Giovanni Ferri, 
Giovannni Majnoui 
(2001) 
Years centered around 
the adoption of capital 
standard 
16 emerging market 
countries30.  
Crisis Countries 
include: Argentina, 
Brazil, Hungary, 
Korea, Malaysia, 
Mexico, Paraguay, 
Thailand, Turkey, 
Venezuela  
Non Crisis Country 
Chile 
Costa Rica  
Poland  
Slovenia  
Examines if the 
enforcement of bank 
capital asset 
requirements ( CARs) 
curtails the supply of 
credit. This was 
already verified for G-
10 countries.  
Found that CAR enforcement 
significantly trimmed credit 
supply, particularly at less 
well capitalized banks. The 
negative impact has been 
larger for countries enforcing 
CAR in the aftermath of 
currency crisis. Also found 
that CARs impact has been 
smaller for foreign banks.  
Peek and 
Rosengren (1995)  
 
Identifies CAR 
enforcement in the 
countries included 
in the sample.  
Jacques and Nigro 
(1097)  
2,570 US commercial 
banks, with assets 
more than $100 
million over two years 
1990-91   
Access the impact of 
regulatory pressure 
variables on capital 
ratios and risk.  
Regulatory pressure has a 
positive impact on CAR and 
negative impact on RISK for 
adequately capitalized banks. 
But it has zero or negative 
impact on CAR and zero 
impact on RISK for 
undercapitalized banks.  
Shrieves and Dahl 
( 1992) 
 
Aggarwal and 
Jacques(1997)  
2,849 US commercial 
banks with assets 
more than $100 
million over three 
yeas 1991-1993.   
Do  Regulatory pressure had a 
positive impact on CAR of 
adequately and inadequately 
capitalized banks. Whereas, it 
has positive impact on RISK 
in 1991 but negative impact in 
1992 and 1993 for both types 
of banks.  
Shrieves and Dahl 
( 1992) 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
30 We followed the same convention. We also used an subset of the samples used in this study as well as the 
dates of implementation of capital regulations presented in Table 2.  
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Table 1: Previous Studies on the behavior of banks regarding capital ratios and risk taking (Contd.) 
Name of the Authors  Sample Period  Main Objectives Findings  Related Studies  
Ediz, Michael and 
Perraudin ( 1998)  
94 UK banks, 4th 
quarter 1989-4th 
quarter 1995.  
Do  Regulatory pressure has 
positive impact on CAR and 
no impact on RISK of 
undercapitalized banks.   
Shrieves and Dahl 
( 1992) 
 
Rime ( 2001)  154 Swiss banks over 
6 years from 1990-95 
Do  Regulations had not impact on 
CAR of adequately capitalized 
banks and positive impact on 
CAR of undercapitalized 
banks. No impact on RISK of 
capitalized and 
undercapitalized banks.  
Shrieves and Dahl 
( 1992) 
 
Aggarwal and 
Jacques(2001) 
1,685 US banks with 
assets more than $100 
million over 6 years 
from 1991-96.  
Do  Regulations had positive 
impact on adequately and 
undercapitalized banks in 
1991. Had positive impact on 
RISK in 91 and zero impact on 
RISK in 92. Had negative 
impact in 93-96 for adequately 
capitalized and 
undercapitalized banks.  
Shrieves and Dahl 
( 1992) 
 
Note: Last four rows were taken from Patrick Van Roy (2003). The rest were collected by us. 
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Table 2: Date of implementing capital requirement regulations similar to Basle Acts  
 
Year  Country 
1994 Argentina 
Hungary 
Turkey 
Venezuela 
Slovenia 
1996 India  
1997 Brazil, 
Korea 
Malaysia 
Thailand 
Chile 
Source:  Maria Concetta Chiuri, Giovanni Ferri, Giovannni Majnoui (2001) 
 
 
Table 3: Selected Countries and Number of Banks from each country 
 
 No of Banks  Percentage of 
Total  
Argentina  16 5.33 
Hungary 14 4.67 
Turkey 26 8.67 
Venezuela 6 2.00 
Slovenia 7 2.33 
India 50 16.67 
Brazil 53 17.67 
Korea 37 12.33 
Malaysia 51 17.00 
Thailand  24 8.00 
Chile  16 5.33 
Total  300 100.00 
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Table 4: Full Information Estimates: Simple Model   
We estimated the two simultaneous equations jointly with GMM and 3SLS methods. In GMM estimates 
we made provisions to include only DRISK as an instrument in the CAR equation only and DCAR was 
used as an instrument in the RISK equation of the system. But this is not the case in 3SLS. In the 3SLS 
estimates all exogenous variables are used to get predicted value of the dependent variables for the first 
stage least square, which was used in the instrumental variable estimation in the second stage. Finally, SUR 
was used at the last stage of 3SLS to take account of cross-equation relation of the error terms.  
Variables  
Parameter 
Estimates P-value 
Parameter 
Estimates 
P-value Parameter 
Estimates P-value 
Parameter 
Estimates P-value 
Panel a: Total Capital 
 GMM 3SLS 
CAR Equation 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Intercept 2.81319 .940 -10.992 0.660 28.1434** 0.037 26.533** 0.039 
DRISK 
-
100.474*** .000 -85.093*** 0.000 -33.6209*** .000 -37.038*** 0.000 
LNASSE
TS -0.47675 .843 0.631 0.707 -1.79759** 0.041 -1.960** 0.018 
ROA -2.09194 .195 -1.753* 0.092 0.937879** 0.022 0.538 0.117 
GOVASS -4.58583 .233 -7.911* 0.084 -0.40158 0.813 -2.344 0.141 
Year2 -10.7631* .089 65.840** 0.019 -4.91376 0.153 49.963*** 0.001 
Year3 -3.62541 .610 -10.822 0.124 -1.60094 0.62 -10.442** 0.011 
Year4 -7.11076 .304 -10.924* 0.090 -0.84287 0.792 -6.487* 0.058 
Year5 -2.97916 .639 4.232 0.530 0.047117 0.986 4.436 0.200 
Domestic 
Credit    -0.177 0.176   -0.063 0.135 
Foreign 
Investmen
t   0.372 0.757   0.474 0.419 
GDP Per 
Capita    4.503** 0.024   3.447*** 0.001 
Inflation    -2.197** 0.019   -1.846*** 0.002 
RISK Equation 
Intercept 0.15135 .545 0.282 0.276 -0.11189 0.378 0.041 0.803 
DCAR 
-
0.03261*** .001 -0.028*** 0.000 -0.01506*** .000 -0.017*** 0.000 
LIASSET
S 0.103384 .625 0.051 0.728 -0.10293* 0.081 -0.096* 0.053 
LLOSS -1.55E-03 .319 -0.003* 0.068 9.64E-05 0.889 -0.001 0.148 
GOVASS -0.064 .447 -0.125** 0.019 -0.01148 0.738 -0.074** 0.018 
Year2  -0.25619* .065 1.692** 0.009 -0.11849 0.104 0.881** 0.011 
Year3 -0.05971 .559 -0.317** 0.054 -0.03282 0.638 -0.140 0.125 
Year4 -0.07455 .475 -0.197** 0.075 -0.05083 0.455 -0.103 0.161 
Year5 -0.0286 .763 0.139 0.173 -0.04056 0.476 0.045 0.542 
Domestic 
Credit    -0.003** 0.050   -0.003*** 0.003 
Foreign 
Investmen
t   -0.013 0.600   0.001 0.961 
GDP Per 
Capita    0.093 0.920   0.058** 0.015 
Inflation    0.039 0.944   -0.033** 0.013 
Note: ‘*’ is significant at 10 percent, ‘**’ is significant at 5 percent, and ‘***’ is significant at 1 percent.  
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Table 4: Full Information Estimates: Simple Model (Cont.) 
We estimated the two simultaneous equations jointly with GMM and 3SLS methods. In GMM estimates 
we made provisions to include only DRISK as an instrument in the CAR equation only and DCAR was 
used as an instrument in the RISK equation of the system. But this is not the case in 3SLS. In the 3SLS 
estimates all exogenous variables are used to get predicted value of the dependent variables for the first 
stage least square, which was used in the instrumental variable estimation in the second stage. Finally, SUR 
was used at the last stage of 3SLS to take account of cross-equation relation of the error terms.  
Variables  
Parameter 
Estimates P-value 
Parameter 
Estimates P-value 
Parameter 
Estimates P-value 
Parameter 
Estimates P-value 
Panel b: Tire 1 Capital 
 GMM 3SLS 
CAR Equation  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Intercept 37.8999*** 0.007 42.076 0.001 37.9341*** 0.005 42.414 0.003 
DRISK -0.10749* 0.076 -0.064 0.438 -0.14865 0.307 -0.154 0.337 
LNASSE
TS -2.19249** 0.038 -2.897 0.005 -2.19109** 0.015 -2.953 0.003 
ROA 1.05491** 0.048 1.331 0.017 1.01467* 0.085 1.223 0.080 
GOVASS 1.95223 0.314 2.423 0.250 1.96254 0.196 2.675 0.123 
Year2 2.27298 0.538 2.971 0.838 2.21379 0.531 3.973 0.819 
Year3 -3.67816 0.373 -4.124 0.369 -3.69667 0.207 -4.619 0.308 
Year4 -0.47655 0.836 -1.273 0.609 -0.52667 0.853 -1.725 0.653 
Year5 0.783922 0.732 1.025 0.744 0.645201 0.79 1.226 0.756 
Domestic 
Credit    0.008 0.829   0.022 0.701 
Foreign 
Investmen
t   0.928 0.088   0.791 0.265 
GDP Per 
Capita    0.093 0.920   0.223 0.859 
Inflation    0.039 0.944   0.024 0.971 
RISK Equation 
Intercept 8.04724* 0.054 7.657 0.084 8.19123* 0.073 7.574 0.216 
DCAR -0.09908 0.145 -0.070 0.299 -0.12794 0.209 -0.117 0.194 
LIASSET
S 0.878081 0.577 -1.401 0.485 0.907254 0.711 -1.449 0.547 
LLOSS -0.10799** 0.035 -0.109 0.028 -0.10665*** .000 -0.107 0.000 
GOVASS 0.62846 0.203 2.173 0.054 0.688339 0.603 2.311 0.092 
Year2  0.534018 0.555 9.701 0.265 0.555441 0.843 9.751 0.467 
Year3 -0.09739 0.906 -2.917 0.247 -0.24496 0.92 -3.136 0.359 
Year4 -0.52735 0.613 -1.548 0.312 -0.59043 0.797 -1.706 0.526 
Year5 -2.32851 0.178 0.303 0.817 -2.33568 0.232 0.368 0.895 
Domestic 
Credit    0.083 0.079   0.085 0.015 
Foreign 
Investmen
t   -1.589 0.056   -1.576 0.001 
GDP Per 
Capita    0.839 0.198   0.851 0.358 
Inflation    -0.323 0.331   -0.307 0.550 
Note: ‘*’ is significant at 10 percent, ‘**’ is significant at 5 percent, and ‘***’ is significant at 1 percent.  
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Table 5: Limited Information Estimates: Simple Model   
To test the robustness of the full information in Table 6, we re-estimate the parameters by dealing with the 
CAR and RISK equations individually. Results are presented below.  
Variables  
Parameter 
Estimates P-value 
Parameter 
Estimates P-value 
Parameter 
Estimates P-value 
Parameter 
Estimates P-value 
Panel a: Total Capital 
 GMM 2SLS 
CAR Equation  
Intercept 27.8936 0.018 21.765 0.067 42.0683*** 0.009 42.754*** 0.009 
DRISK 
-
16.9592*** 0.000 -18.145*** 0.002 
-
19.9542*** 0.000 -22.999*** 0.000 
LNASSETS -1.44545* 0.062 -1.680* 0.068 -2.67384** 0.012 -3.123*** 0.005 
ROA 2.16293*** 0.000 1.995*** 0.000 1.51668*** 0.002 1.211*** 0.008 
GOVASS 2.21755 0.152 0.218 0.906 0.299882 0.873 -0.653 0.727 
Year2 1.72211 0.624 17.688 0.454 -3.65533 0.330 44.669** 0.012 
Year3 -1.64897 0.515 -4.415 0.448 -0.99527 0.777 -10.295** 0.026 
Year4 -2.04976 0.547 -4.705 0.357 0.61146 0.860 -5.198 0.182 
Year5 0.267063 0.909 1.567 0.671 0.990472 0.735 4.639 0.237 
Domestic 
Credit    -0.051 0.420   -0.026 0.594 
Foreign 
Investment   1.475 0.108   0.583 0.385 
GDP Per 
Capita    1.077 0.554   3.110** 0.011 
Inflation    -0.367 0.657   -1.714** 0.011 
RISK Equation 
Intercept -0.28274 0.439 0.059 0.702 0.027999 0.942 0.065 0.734 
DCAR 
-8.41E-
03*** 0.000 -0.014*** 0.000 
-9.95E-
03*** 0.000 -0.013*** 0.000 
LIASSETS 0.011874 0.611 -0.137*** 0.003 -4.75E-03 0.850 -0.179*** 0.007 
LLOSS -0.02426** 0.028 -0.002* 0.101 -0.02082** 0.072 -0.002* 0.059 
GOVASS -0.04867 0.117 -0.052* 0.077 -0.04564 0.269 -0.064* 0.073 
Year2  -0.04341 0.475 0.878** 0.023 -0.10712 0.198 0.565 0.158 
Year3 0.033356 0.623 -0.163* 0.077 -0.03608 0.645 -0.056 0.593 
Year4 -0.02738 0.684 -0.101 0.204 -0.07077 0.358 -0.052 0.539 
Year5 -8.26E-03 0.899 0.062 0.463 -0.02965 0.649 0.007 0.931 
Domestic 
Credit    -0.002** 0.019   -0.003*** 0.002 
Foreign 
Investment   -0.002 0.848   -0.001 0.958 
GDP Per 
Capita    0.057 0.036   0.035 0.208 
Inflation    -0.032** 0.011   -0.021 0.156 
Note: ‘*’ is significant at 10 percent, ‘**’ is significant at 5 percent, and ‘***’ is significant at 1 percent. 
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Table 5: Limited Information Estimates: Simple Model (Contd.)  
To test the robustness of the full information in Table 6, we re-estimate the parameters by dealing with the 
CAR and RISK equations individually. Results are presented below.  
Variables  
Parameter 
Estimates P-value 
Parameter 
Estimates P-value 
Parameter 
Estimates P-value 
Parameter 
Estimates P-value 
Panel b: Tire 1 Capital 
 GMM 2SLS 
CAR Equation  
Intercept 41.3367*** 0.003 48.969*** 0.000 37.8999*** 0.011 42.076*** 0.010 
DRISK -0.085636* 0.053 -0.031 0.616 -0.10749 0.5 -0.064 0.728 
LNASSET
S 
-
2.78663*** 0.005 -3.687*** 0.000 -2.19249** 0.027 -2.897*** 0.010 
ROA 8.43E-01* 0.087 1.168** 0.021 1.05E+00 0.102 1.331* 0.097 
GOVASS -4.98E-01 0.742 0.075 0.962 1.95E+00 0.24 2.423 0.222 
Year2 -0.417308 0.91 -9.799 0.428 2.27298 0.556 2.971 0.881 
Year3 -2.85E+00 0.505 -2.283 0.620 -3.67816 0.25 -4.124 0.426 
Year4 0.126818 0.956 -1.189 0.631 -0.47655 0.878 -1.273 0.772 
Year5 0.064412 0.976 -1.232 0.637 0.783922 0.767 1.025 0.821 
Domestic 
Credit    0.008 0.814   0.008 0.907 
Foreign 
Investment   1.121*** 0.008   0.928 0.254 
GDP Per 
Capita    -0.508 0.521   0.093 0.949 
Inflation    0.410 0.414   0.039 0.959 
RISK Equation 
Intercept 4.2237 0.068 3.360 0.032 8.04724 0.107 7.657 0.275 
DCAR -0.038235* 0.07 -0.015 0.462 -0.099079 0.374 -0.070 0.501 
LIASSETS -0.238374 0.618 -1.384** 0.048 0.878081 0.743 -1.401 0.612 
LLOSS 
-
0.054993** 0.04 -0.048*** 0.005 
-
0.107988**
* 0.001 -0.109*** 0.001 
GOVASS 0.74655* 0.066 1.018 0.024 0.62846 0.664 2.173 0.166 
Year2  0.425878 0.414 4.243 0.103 0.534018 0.862 9.701 0.527 
Year3 0.258753 0.563 -0.812 0.240 -0.097393 0.971 -2.917 0.456 
Year4 -0.17222 0.747 -0.682 0.186 -0.527348 0.833 -1.548 0.615 
Year5 -0.528367 0.223 0.343 0.508 -2.32851 0.276 0.303 0.925 
Domestic 
Credit    0.026** 0.031   0.083** 0.037 
Foreign 
Investment   -0.618*** 0.009   -1.589*** 0.004 
GDP Per 
Capita    0.329* 0.085   0.839 0.428 
Inflation    -0.130 0.153   -0.323 0.582 
Note: ‘*’ is significant at 10 percent, ‘**’ is significant at 5 percent, and ‘***’ is significant at 1 percent. 
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Table 6: Full Information Estimates: Regulator Pressure Dummy Included  
We estimated the two simultaneous equations jointly with GMM and 3SLS methods. In GMM estimates 
we made provisions to include only DRISK as an instrument in the CAR equation only and DCAR was 
used as an instrument in the RISK equation of the system. But this is not the case in 3SLS. In the 3SLS 
estimates all exogenous variables are used to get predicted value of the dependent variables for the first 
stage least square, which was used in the instrumental variable estimation in the second stage. Finally, SUR 
was used at the last stage of 3SLS to take account of cross-equation relation of the error terms.  
Variables 
Parameter 
Estimates P-value 
Parameter 
Estimates P-value 
Parameter 
Estimates P-value 
Parameter 
Estimates P-value 
Panel a: Total Capital 
 GMM 3SLS 
CAR Equation  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Intercept -1.396 0.971 -22.737 0.402 12.148 0.355 9.899 0.503 
DRISK -94.188*** 0.000 -79.714*** 0.000 -27.432*** 0.000 -32.265*** 0.000 
RegDum
my -0.188 0.626 -0.288 0.419 -0.564*** 0.000 -0.438*** 0.008 
LNASSE
TS -0.270 0.911 1.344 0.423 -1.006 0.228 -0.974 0.306 
ROA -2.173 0.159 -2.074* 0.062 0.198 0.653 -0.018 0.968 
GOVASS -4.394 0.207 -7.836* 0.062 -0.505 0.737 -2.406 0.111 
Year2 -10.845 0.063 64.998** 0.010 -6.038** 0.048 48.723*** 0.001 
Year3 -3.946 0.539 -11.157* 0.086 -3.000 0.297 -10.925*** 0.004 
Year4 -6.847 0.293 -10.741* 0.062 -1.174 0.677 -6.425** 0.043 
Year5 -2.779 0.644 4.937 0.446 0.152 0.949 5.520* 0.088 
Domestic 
Credit    -0.159 0.221   -0.041 0.303 
Foreign 
Investmen
t   -0.155 0.915   -0.253 0.683 
GDP Per 
Capita    4.533** 0.013   3.493*** 0.001 
Inflation    -2.131** 0.012   -1.723*** 0.002 
RISK Equation  
Intercept -0.343* 0.076 -0.019 0.929 -0.171 0.206 0.007 0.965 
DCAR -0.052** 0.046 -0.040*** 0.001 -0.018*** 0.000 -0.019*** 0.000 
RegDum
my -0.042 0.109 -0.026** 0.044 -0.007* 0.075 -0.006* 0.093 
LIASSET
S -0.087 0.387 -0.080 0.362 -0.135** 0.031 -0.121** 0.025 
LLOSS 0.000 0.851 -0.002 0.142 0.000 0.993 -0.001 0.114 
GOVASS -0.007 0.854 -0.090** 0.042 -0.001 0.974 -0.067** 0.033 
Year2 -0.353** 0.050 1.880*** 0.005 -0.133* 0.070 0.898*** 0.010 
Year3 -0.165 0.204 -0.412*** 0.002 -0.053 0.453 -0.155* 0.093 
Year4 -0.049 0.685 -0.203* 0.076 -0.049 0.470 -0.101 0.172 
Year5 -0.013 0.893 0.220* 0.088 -0.037 0.513 0.061 0.411 
Domestic 
Credit    -0.002 0.279   -0.003*** 0.005 
Foreign 
Investmen
t   -0.040 0.107   -0.006 0.647 
GDP Per 
Capita    0.134*** 0.005   0.060** 0.012 
Inflation    -0.069*** 0.006   -0.033** 0.013 
Note: ‘*’ is significant at 10 percent, ‘**’ is significant at 5 percent, and ‘***’ is significant at 1 percent.  
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Table 6: Full Information Estimates: Regulator Pressure Dummy Included (Contd.) 
We estimated the two simultaneous equations jointly with GMM and 3SLS methods. In GMM estimates 
we made provisions to include only DRISK as an instrument in the CAR equation only and DCAR was 
used as an instrument in the RISK equation of the system. But this is not the case in 3SLS. In the 3SLS 
estimates all exogenous variables are used to get predicted value of the dependent variables for the first 
stage least square, which was used in the instrumental variable estimation in the second stage. Finally, SUR 
was used at the last stage of 3SLS to take account of cross-equation relation of the error terms.  
Variables  
Parameter 
Estimates P-value 
Parameter 
Estimates P-value 
Parameter 
Estimates P-value 
Parameter 
Estimates 
 
Panel b: Tire 1 Capital 
 GMM 3SLS 
CAR Equation  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Intercept -7.317 0.503 -14.321 0.320 -7.044 0.556 -13.087 0.340 
DRISK -0.091** 0.033 -0.099* 0.069 -0.138 0.196 -0.158 0.191 
RegDummy -0.849*** 0.000 -0.974*** 0.000 -0.849*** 0.000 -0.966*** 0.000 
LNASSETS 0.181 0.824 0.779 0.474 0.166 0.824 0.669 0.470 
ROA 0.508 0.196 0.625 0.193 0.461 0.295 0.558 0.297 
GOVASS 0.434 0.685 -0.750 0.530 0.441 0.698 -0.557 0.688 
Year2 1.717 0.364 1.645 0.882 1.646 0.526 2.353 0.856 
Year3 -3.454 0.262 -2.377 0.454 -3.472 0.107 -2.731 0.423 
Year4 -0.389 0.839 1.384 0.396 -0.443 0.832 1.053 0.717 
Year5 1.233 0.468 -0.026 0.991 1.080 0.544 0.144 0.961 
Domestic 
Credit    -0.031 0.276   -0.021 0.640 
Foreign 
Investment   -0.295 0.467   -0.371 0.511 
GDP Per 
Capita    -0.173 0.805   -0.080 0.933 
Inflation    -0.032 0.940   -0.042 0.932 
RISK Equation  
Intercept 7.231* 0.061 6.747 0.104 6.768 0.151 6.145 0.315 
DCAR -0.172 0.131 -0.178* 0.097 -0.244 0.106 -0.247* 0.060 
RegDummy -0.114 0.261 -0.186 0.137 -0.177 0.314 -0.250 0.130 
LIASSETS 1.054 0.480 -1.270 0.449 1.049 0.669 -1.262 0.596 
LLOSS -0.110** 0.034 -0.112** 0.030 -0.108*** 0.000 -0.109*** 0.000 
GOVASS 0.476 0.359 1.754* 0.063 0.487 0.716 1.723 0.220 
Year2 0.621 0.502 10.253 0.237 0.682 0.808 10.378 0.434 
Year3 -0.291 0.744 -3.122 0.197 -0.560 0.819 -3.354 0.322 
Year4 -0.513 0.629 -1.242 0.408 -0.569 0.803 -1.261 0.637 
Year5 -2.094 0.203 0.498 0.710 -1.995 0.314 0.589 0.832 
Domestic 
Credit    0.079* 0.081   0.079** 0.023 
Foreign 
Investment   -1.669* 0.053   -1.679*** 0.000 
GDP Per 
Capita    0.841 0.193   0.846 0.355 
Inflation    -0.351 0.278   -0.345 0.497 
Note: ‘*’ is significant at 10 percent, ‘**’ is significant at 5 percent, and ‘***’ is significant at 1 percent.  
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Table 7: Limited Information Estimates: Regulator Pressure Dummy Included 
To test the robustness of the full information in Table 6, we re-estimate the parameters by dealing with the 
CAR and RISK equations individually. Results are presented below.  
Variables 
Parameter 
Estimates P-value 
Parameter 
Estimates P-value 
Parameter 
Estimates P-value 
Parameter 
Estimates P-value 
Panel a: Total Capital 
 GMM 3SLS 
CAR Equation 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Intercept -16.107 0.102 -19.094 0.155 19.030 0.220 12.175 0.519 
DRISK -2.516 0.437 -10.756** 0.046 -16.593*** 0.001 -21.282*** 0.000 
RegDummy -1.000*** 0.000 -0.869*** 0.000 -0.637*** 0.000 -0.562*** 0.006 
LNASSETS 0.766 0.263 1.060 0.306 -1.481 0.137 -1.198 0.336 
ROA 0.312 0.354 0.263 0.529 0.436 0.403 0.165 0.774 
GOVASS 0.409 0.579 -1.402 0.179 -0.139 0.934 -1.534 0.389 
Year2 1.431 0.571 -4.776 0.762 -5.518 0.102 46.022 0.006 
Year3 -3.953* 0.056 -0.249 0.952 -2.671 0.398 -11.025** 0.011 
Year4 -0.809 0.696 0.726 0.823 -0.218 0.944 -5.651 0.121 
Year5 -0.176 0.897 -0.721 0.767 0.784 0.763 5.959 0.108 
Domestic 
Credit    -0.073* 0.074   -0.012 0.790 
Foreign 
Investment   0.562 0.173   -0.478 0.516 
GDP Per 
Capita    -0.502 0.684   3.366 0.004 
Inflation    0.381 0.499   -1.653 0.009 
RISK Equation  
Intercept -0.160 0.233 0.054 0.738 -0.186 0.228 0.067 0.737 
DCAR -0.013*** 0.000 -0.014*** 0.000 -0.011*** 0.000 -0.013*** 0.000 
RegDummy -0.004** 0.070 -0.001 0.800 -0.001 0.860 0.000 0.972 
LIASSETS -0.180*** 0.000 -0.147*** 0.000 -0.189** 0.011 -0.179** 0.011 
LLOSS -0.001 0.187 -0.002 0.134 0.000 0.875 -0.002* 0.064 
GOVASS 0.012 0.677 -0.056* 0.060 0.006 0.883 -0.064* 0.079 
Year2 -0.063 0.359 0.823 0.036 -0.098 0.227 0.564 0.164 
Year3 -0.020 0.765 -0.156 0.108 -0.027 0.729 -0.056 0.603 
Year4 -0.047 0.479 -0.093 0.272 -0.046 0.538 -0.052 0.543 
Year5 -0.029 0.674 0.055 0.513 -0.046 0.458 0.007 0.936 
Domestic 
Credit    -0.003** 0.014   -0.003*** 0.003 
Foreign 
Investment   0.000 0.992   -0.001 0.968 
GDP Per 
Capita    0.053 0.061   0.035 0.217 
Inflation    -0.030 0.019   -0.021 0.161 
Note: ‘*’ is significant at 10 percent, ‘**’ is significant at 5 percent, and ‘***’ is significant at 1 percent.  
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Table 7: Limited Information Estimates: Regulator pressure Dummy Included  (Contd.) 
To test the robustness of the full information in Table 6, we re-estimate the parameters by dealing with the 
CAR and RISK equations separately. Results are presented below.  
Variables 
Parameter 
Estimates P-value 
Parameter 
Estimates P-value 
Parameter 
Estimates P-value 
Parameter 
Estimates P-value 
Panel b: Tire 1 Capital 
 GMM 3SLS 
CAR Equation 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Intercept 5.995 0.568 4.820 0.689 -6.097 0.643 -14.321 0.368 
DRISK -0.088** 0.014 -0.055 0.204 -0.117 0.323 -0.099 0.482 
RegDummy -0.776*** 0.000 -0.810*** 0.000 -0.875*** 0.000 -0.974*** 0.000 
LNASSETS -0.898 0.254 -0.685 0.451 0.016 0.984 0.779 0.468 
ROA 0.490 0.178 0.624 0.064 0.651 0.179 0.625 0.314 
GOVASS -1.439* 0.100 -1.954* 0.065 0.180 0.887 -0.750 0.641 
Year2 0.202 0.909 -2.303 0.765 2.233 0.437 1.645 0.913 
Year3 -4.574 0.134 -3.690 0.225 -3.364 0.158 -2.377 0.547 
Year4 -0.335 0.841 1.006 0.389 0.253 0.913 1.384 0.681 
Year5 -0.386 0.767 -1.281 0.479 0.626 0.751 -0.026 0.994 
Domestic 
Credit    -0.029 0.242   -0.031 0.543 
Foreign 
Investment   0.109 0.739   -0.295 0.652 
GDP Per 
Capita    -0.331 0.525   -0.173 0.874 
Inflation    -0.012 0.970   -0.032 0.955 
RISK Equation  
Intercept 3.961* 0.067 2.549* 0.054 6.903 0.198 6.747 0.341 
DCAR -0.062 0.120 -0.031 0.194 -0.173 0.293 -0.178 0.242 
RegDummy -0.038 0.388 -0.043 0.180 -0.125 0.539 -0.186 0.331 
LIASSETS -0.267 0.566 -1.286** 0.047 1.064 0.695 -1.270 0.646 
LLOSS -0.054** 0.039 -0.043** 0.018 -0.108*** 0.001 -0.112*** 0.001 
GOVASS 0.784 0.062 0.798** 0.048 0.423 0.777 1.754 0.281 
Year2 0.454 0.392 4.212* 0.077 0.662 0.831 10.253 0.505 
Year3 0.331 0.481 -0.682 0.224 -0.300 0.912 -3.122 0.426 
Year4 -0.062 0.907 -0.382 0.384 -0.440 0.862 -1.242 0.689 
Year5 -0.395 0.330 0.494 0.311 -2.181 0.314 0.498 0.877 
Domestic 
Credit    0.023** 0.063   0.079** 0.049 
Foreign 
Investment   -0.595** 0.027   -1.669*** 0.003 
GDP Per 
Capita    0.322* 0.068   0.841 0.427 
Inflation    -0.127 0.112   -0.351 0.551 
Note: ‘*’ is significant at 10 percent, ‘**’ is significant at 5 percent, and ‘***’ is significant at 1 percent.  
 40
Table 8: Substitution Effect of Capital Regulations  
 
Author Country and Period  Capital Approach  Capital vs. Risk Taking  
Shrieves and Dhal 
( 1992)  
US 1984-86 1981 Standards  Positive Relationship  
Wall and Peterson 
( 1995) 
US 1989-92 Basle Accord  Constrained Capital  
Calem and Rob 
(1996) 
US 1984-93 Basle Accord Positive Relationship 
Jacques and Nigro 
( 1997) 
US 1990-91 Basle Accord Positive Relationship 
Aggarwal and 
Jacques (1998) 
US 1991-93 Basle Accord and Prompt 
Corrective Action of  
Positive Relationship 
Ediz et al ( 1998) UK 1989-95 Basle Accord Positive Relationship 
Rime ( 2000)  Switzerland 1989-95 Basle Accord and Prompt 
Corrective Action of  
No Effect to Risk  
Source: Donsyah Yudistira, 2003.  
 
